Respect for patients’ self-determination has long been considered central to efforts to improve end-of-life care, yet efforts to promote advance directives or engage patients in end-of-life discussions are often unsuccessful. In this article, I contend that this is because the shared decision-making approach typically used in healthcare assumes patients’ capacity to make rational choices, which is not always possible in end-of-life decisions. Drawing on decision theory, behavioral psychology, and related studies of endof-life care, I present a growing body of evidence (...) that suggests the novelty, complexity, and uncertainty of end-of-life circumstances make rational and stable preferences difficult to establish. I argue that an effective decision-making approach for the terminally ill must recognize and respond to the unique characteristics of endof-life choices, including their nonrational dimensions. I conclude with a description of an initiative that appears to do so, resulting in increased patients’ satisfaction. (shrink)

In many research studies, tumor biopsies are an unavoidable requirement for achieving key scientific aims. Yet some commentators view mandatory research biopsies as coercive and suggest they should be optional, or at least optional until further data are obtained regarding their scientific usefulness. Further complicating the ethical picture is the fact that some research biopsies offer a potential for clinical benefit to trial participants. We interviewed and surveyed a convenience sample of participants in phase I clinical trials at a single (...) institution. Our primary aim was to describe phase I participants’ understanding of whether a research biopsy offered them the prospect of medical benefit. We also endeavored to describe participants’ views about biopsies—specifically, the benefits of biopsies, if any, and whether biopsies were acceptable, risky, or discouraged trial participation. Finally, we collected data on demographics and attitudes to see if any strong correlations with misunderstanding, acceptability, or riskiness existed. Overall, the respondents tended to view research biopsies as acceptable, though they did not succeed in identifying the lack of benefit of a research biopsy. These findings call for renewed efforts in consent conversations and documents to carefully describe the benefits, or lack thereof, of research biopsies. (shrink)

A rational person doesn’t believe just anything. There are limits on what it is rational to believe. How wide are these limits? That’s the main question that interests me here. But a secondary question immediately arises: What factors impose these limits? A first stab is to say that one’s evidence determines what it is epistemically permissible for one to believe. Many will claim that there are further, non-evidentiary factors relevant to the epistemic rationality of belief. I will be ignoring the (...) details of alternative answers in order to focus on the question of what kind of rational constraints one’s evidence puts on belief. Our main question concerns how far epistemic permission and obligation can come apart.1 Suppose I am epistemically permitted to believe P, i.e., it would not be irrational for me to believe it. Am I thereby obliged to believe P, or are other options rationally available to me?2 Might I be equally rational in remaining agnostic about P, or even believing not-P? Or could even a slightly stronger or weaker degree of confidence be just as reasonable? (shrink)

I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A natural answer might be that I remember that his name is ‘Owen’ which is usually a boy’s name. Here I’ve given information that might be part of a causal explanation of my believing that Tom’s baby is a boy. I do have such a memory and it is largely what sustains my conviction. But I haven’t given you just (...) any causally relevant information, I’ve given my grounds for my belief. I’ve given reasons that might justify me in supposing that Tom’s baby is a boy. Less naturally, the question might be taken as a request for a broader causal explanation of my holding this belief. Appropriate answers might cite all manner of facts concerning the evolution of the human race, why I chose to pursue philosophy and hence came to know Tom, the mechanisms of email transmission, the firing of various neurons, the circumstances of concept formation as a result of which I’m able to grasp the thought that Tom’s baby is a boy, and so on. It is an interesting question what distinguishes the narrower set of answers that I first suggested. I won’t pursue that here. I assume you have a good enough sense of the distinction I’m drawing. We might call the narrower set of answers justifying reasons, the kind of reasons I might cite in justifying my belief. Answers of the first sort are clearly relevant to epistemological evaluation. In assessing whether you know p or are rational in believing it to the degree you do, I will naturally want to consider what reasons you have for your belief. In deliberating myself about whether to believe p, in seeking an answer to the question of whether p, I will naturally consider what reasons or grounds I have to suppose that p. But what I want to focus on here is how explanations of the broader sort bear on such questions as whether to believe p. From a third-person perspective we can ask, ‘In assessing the epistemic status of S’s belief that p, what is the relevance of causal information that lies outside of the realm of justifying reasons?’ From the first-person standpoint we can ask ‘In seeking to answer whether p, how should such causal information affect my deliberations?’ At first it might seem that such broader causal information could have little relevance if any. Like any belief my belief that p can be traced back to innumerable causes from far and wide.. (shrink)

A common analysis of current U.S. politics identifies the main problem as ideological polarization leading to government dysfunction, and moderation as the main solution. But drawing from Martin Luther King Jr., I contend that the main problem is sectarianism or us-them thinking, leading to injustice, and the main solution a social movement of love and justice. Notably, while many call for deemphasizing ideas, my solution calls for more emphasis on ideas. The purpose of government is justice. The moderation solution, although (...) superficially value-free, implicitly values the status quo or gradualism over justice, reflecting King’s “white moderate, who is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice.” Sectarianism is bad for involving animosity toward outgroup members and undermining critical thinking, resulting in decision-making based on group power rather than rationality and justice. The moderation solution resembles sectarianism in encourag­ing decision-making based not on substance but relative to where others stand. Moreover, responding to injustice with moderation often involves capitulation to it. Counteracting sectarianism requires caring across group lines and making political decisions based on justice. A social movement, appealing to high ideals and broad solidarity—like King’s “extremism” for love and justice—is necessary to transform policies and our political culture. (shrink)

Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i.e. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. Chalmers suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem.” Against this, I argue that work on the meta-problem will likely fail to make the hard problem any easier. For each of the main stances on the hard problem can provide an account of problem reports, (...) and we have no way of deciding which of these accounts gives the correct explanation of an individual’s problem reports without presupposing a stance on the hard problem. We thus cannot determine which of the available solutions to the meta-problem is correct without having already solved the hard problem. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the structural domination of whiteness as it intersects with the potential of individual critique and reflexivity. I reflect on my positioning as a white nurse researcher while researching international nurse migration. I draw on two large qualitative studies and one small focus group study to discuss my reactions as a white researcher to evidence of institutional racism in the British health services and my growing awareness of how racism is reproduced in the British (...) nursing profession. (shrink)

Mr. T. H. Mcpherson has given, in a recent article in PHILOSOPHY , various reasons for supposing that there was a development in Butler's ethics from the Sermons to the Analogy . He argues that Butler was in the Sermons a “rational egoist” or “Ethical Eudaemonist,” and in the Analogy an Intuitionist. By “Ethical Eudaemonism” he seems1 to mean that “the ground or criterion of rightness is conduciveness to the agent's interest” or that “it is the happiness-producing character of acts (...) that makes them right” . I shall use the phrase “McPherson's view” to denote the theory that this was Butler's view in the Sermons. (shrink)

A popular response to the Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that mental events depend on their physical bases in such a way that the causation of a physical effect by a mental event and its physical base needn’t generate any problematic form of causal overdetermination, even if mental events are numerically distinct from and irreducible to their physical bases. This paper presents and defends a form of dualism that implements this response by using a dispositional essentialist view of properties to (...) argue that the psychophysical laws linking mental events to their physical bases are metaphysically necessary. I show the advantages of such a position over an alternative form of dualism that merely places more “modal weight” on psychophysical laws than on physical laws. The position is then defended against the objection that it is inconsistent with dualism. Lastly, some suggestions are made as to how dualists might clarify the contribution that mental causes make to their physical effects. (shrink)

To solve the problem of induction we had first better know what it is. Some ways of formulating the worry about induction are underwhelming as they depend on assumptions that don’t survive much scrutiny. Perhaps the most disturbing argument for inductive skepticism appeals to the claim that we could not possibly be justified in taking our inductive methods to be reliable independently of our use of those methods. And the use of inductive methods cannot give us justification to suppose that (...) they are reliable. I argue for a new way to escape the first horn of this dilemma. (shrink)

Among theories which fit all of our data, we prefer the simpler over the more complex. Why? Surely not merely for practical convenience or aesthetic pleasure. But how could we be justified in this preference without knowing in advance that the world is more likely to be simple than complex? And isn’t this a rather extravagant a priori assumption to make? I want to suggest some steps we can take toward reducing this embarrassment, by showing that the assumption which supports (...) favouring simplicity is far more modest than it first seems. (shrink)

Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña’s _Being Rational and Being Right_ makes a challenging case that one’s evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles that evidence can play in inquiry if we accept this claim. It turns out that Comesaña’s position lends itself to the conclusion that while false evidence is possible and not even terribly uncommon, I can be rationally sure that I don’t currently have any and perhaps also (...) that I won’t get any, and (absent certain evidence to the contrary) you are not afflicted with any either. This conclusion might seem too good to be true. I finish by raising a puzzle about one of the main motivations for Comesaña’s view. (shrink)

“He's [the Red King's] dreaming now,” said Tweedledee: “and what do you think he's dreaming about?”Alice said, “Nobody can guess that.”“Why, about you!” Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly. “And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be?”“Where I am now, of course,” said Alice.“Not you!” Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. “You'd be nowhere. Why, you're only a sort of thing in his dream!”“If that there King was to wake,” added Tweedledum, “you'd go out—bang!—just like a candle.”“I (...) shouldn't!” Alice exclaimed indignantly. “Besides, if I'm only a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I should like to know?”“Ditto,” said Tweedledum.“Ditto, ditto!” cried Tweedledee.He shouted this so loud that Alice couldn't help saying “Hush! You'll be waking him, I'm afraid, if you make so much noise.”“Well, it's no use your talking about waking him,” said Tweedledum, “when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know very well you're not real.”“I am real!” said Alice, and began to cry.“You won't make yourself a bit realler by crying,” Tweedledee remarked: “there's nothing to cry about.”“If I wasn't real,” Alice said—half laughing through her tears, it all seemed so ridiculous —“I shouldn't be able to cry.”“I hope you don't suppose those are real tears?” Tweedledum interrupted in a tone of great contempt.—Through the Looking Glass. (shrink)

Professors of philosophy do from time to time seek to wear the clothes of relevanceAlasdair MacIntyre (1984, 36)I recall one of the first bioethics conferences I ever attended. During the question–...

The COVID pandemic was an exceptional public health situation – which brought with it unprecedented restrictions across the global populace. But what was it about this pandemic which caused us to implement such drastic restrictions on liberty? Much of the ethical debate on restrictive measures such as lockdowns and vaccine requirements focused on the potential harm that individuals cause to other individuals by the risk of infection. I will suggest that this may come from a reliance on J.S. Mill’s harm (...) principle as providing the ultimate justification for coercion – i.e., the well-accepted principle that state coercion is justified in order to prevent the imposition of unacceptable risk of harm to others. Though there have been attempts, in the wider public health ethics literature, to use the harm principle as a basis for restricting contribution to collective harms, I will suggest that these attempts cannot rely on the harm principle alone. I will then turn to the ways in which an individual-based line of reasoning does not capture a distinctive sort of harm posed by the COVID pandemic (and others like it): the potential failure of healthcare systems. I will draw out three ways in which a focus on the harm that an individual poses to another individual fails to capture the full scope of harm wrought by the collapse of healthcare systems. First, it can’t adequately capture the cumulative and “looping effects” of the harm caused by strained healthcare systems. Second, it fails to capture the widespread ripple effects the failure of a central societal institution can have on other institutions. And third, the failure of a healthcare system can impose “psychic costs”, affecting the moral character of all members of society, reducing trust in institutions, and potentially posing an existential threat to the fabric of society. Finally, I will sketch some implications of the recognition of this distinctive sort of harm for the justification of coercive public health measures. (shrink)

It is as if [W. J. T.] Mitchell, who in his stance as a literary theorist is willing to admit of a plurality of equally legitimate critical modes, were unwilling to extend this pluralism to the consideration of history itself. By this I do not mean that he would be unwilling to view the history of criticism as a cacophony or polyphony of contending critical positions, as a never=ending circle of critical viewpoints, with no one of them being able finally (...) to declare itself the winner for all time, but rather that he must feel that this is the only legitimate perspective on that history. Such a perspective on history has a name, and it is historicism—the perspective associated with Ranke and Goethe in Friedrich Meinecke’s great book on this subject, the perspective which, in Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, is identified with the fate of literary realism in the West. Although the name given to this perspective by Meinecke suggests that it is the historical perspective, contemporary historical theory and practice deny it that claim. In point of fact, if we look at contemporary historical theory and practice, we must admit that there are as many perspectives on history as there are modes of critical practice in literary studies. And this for a very good reason: the referent of the term “history” is as indeterminable, is as much a matter of principled contestation, as the term “literature” itself. So that, if one wished to “correct” certain critical positions by reminding their proponents of the necessity of a proper “sense of history,” it would be just as legitimate to correct the corrector by reminding him that the history of historiography displays the same kind of confusion over the “sense of history” that the history of criticism displays over the “sense of literature.” When Mitchell characterizes the current schism in criticism as another enactment of the quarrel of ancients and moderns, he is surely right; but he fails to note that this reenactment takes place within an atmosphere made more murky by the fact that there is no generally agreed upon “sense of history” to which one can appeal in order to characterize the differences between the two camps. It is not as if the ancients and the moderns agree on some body of fact from which they draw different implications regarding the attitude that one ought to assume vis-à-vis modern as against ancient literature. For what is at issue is not the interpretation of the facts but the nature of historical factuality itself. Hayden White is Presidential Professor of Historical Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “Historical Interpretation” , “The Narrativization of Real Events” , and “The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality”. (shrink)

Distress and guilt are common aspects of grief. For many, especially those experiencing complicated grief, guilt can often feel overwhelming and be prolonged. Those grieving are often subject to thoughts of the form “If only X” or “I should have done Y.” Fueling these thoughts is the belief that, somehow, a loved one has been harmed by death. Some who are grieving, often experience the thought that they are disappointing those who have passed or, even, harming the memory of those (...) they love. These feelings have little logical support if, as Epicurus suggests, the dead can’t be harmed, and death is not a misfortune to the dead. In this article I will outline the Epicurean view on death with the expectation that it may be useful in philosophical counseling for those experiencing anguish as a part of the process. (shrink)

Traditionally ‘imagination’ primarily denotes the faculty of mental imagery, other usages being derivative. However, contemporary philosophers commonly hold it to be a polysemous term, with several unrelated senses. This effectively eliminates this culturally important concept as an appropriate explanandum for science, and paves the way for a thoroughgoing eliminative materialism. White challenges both these views of imagination, arguing that ‘imagine’ never means ‘suppose,’ ‘believe,’ ‘pretend’ or ‘visualize,’ that imagery may occur without imagination, and that the true sense of ‘imagine’ (...) is ‘think of as possibly being so.’ I defend a version of the traditional view. The disseverance of imagination from imagery is motivated by an implicit version of the theory of mental images as pictures. Other contemporary scientific theories of imagery do not entail it. I defend a view of imagery as arising from the interpretative aspect of perception and connect this, and our contemporary concept of imagination, to the root Aristotelian concept of φαντασία.This captures the association between imagination and creativity, and reveals the coherence of the concept, more plausibly than White’s theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:390 HUME'S DIALOGUES AND THE COMEDY OF RELIGION Laughter is the key to Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Indeed, I would suggest that if the Dialogues have not made one laugh, and if one has not experienced the sheer delight of Hume's rhetorical excesses and gaiety, then one hasn't really understood this work at all. From this perspective, the usual questions are irrelevant — Is Hume Cleanthes or Philo? (...) Is Philo a mitigated sceptic or a Pyrrhonian? Such debates are sterile and miss the point, for however consistent or inconsistent the characters may be, the actual drama of the text has an intention and a direction all of its own, destroying the religious hypothesis not so much by 'serious' calculated argument as by ridicule and excess. Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are the expression of a healthy and cheerful malice which strives at every turn to intensify the sense of the absurdity of religion. Hence their flavour is primarily rhetorical, and it would be a mistake to consider them as merely a collection of paraphraseable proofs directed against the possibility of rational theology. This is not to say, however, that Hume did not take religion seriously; on the contrary, he uses all of the devices of comedy in order to overwhelm it — rather as Nietzsche was to argue: "Not by wrath does one kill but by laughter. ml In this paper, I will consider the rhetorical aspect of Hume's Dialogues to show how the literary mode — the elaboration and contrast of characters, the use of parody and sudden turns in the plot, etc. — enables Hume to make a far more compelling assault on the religious hypothesis than the plain recital of 391 'reasonable' objections would ever achieve. I will focus my discussion on three central themes: First, the professed acceptance of God by all of the participants, and the consequent need for an oblique attack upon religion; second, Hume's comic perspectives on the argument from Design; and third, Hume's development of an 'antinomies of religion,' whereby the various religious arguments are used to undermine each other. 1. The Belief in God No man; no man, at least of common sense, I am persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being but the nature of God. Ostensibly, the one thing that is never questioned in the Dialogues, the one thing that all the participants remain agreed upon, is that God exists. Indeed, it seems that however limited the scope of natural theology may turn out to be, the actual being of God can never be in dispute, for in the Dialogues, belief in God is often presented as if it were an unchallengeable 'given' of human experience. Cleanthes, for example, apparently follows Locke in arguing for the reasonableness of theism; and yet, when he is pressed he defends the Design hypothesis in terms of its psychological irresistibility, appealing to a natural sentiment of belief rather than the claim of any argument: Consider, anatomize the eye: Survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation.... it requires time, reflection and study, to summon up those frivolous, though 392 abstruse, objections, which can support infidelity (D 154). According to Cleanthes, the Design hypothesis is so self-evident that it really does not need any philosophical justification at all. It is simply the articulation of what we all already knew to be true: The comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many instances of order and design in nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation (D 216). Demea also denies that religion is based upon argument. He claims that each man is brought to feel the truth of religion within himself through the consciousness of his own complete ignorance and misery. And in this respect, 'reason' can only hamper religious belief. Finally, at the end of the Dialogues, even Philo... (shrink)

Using an ethnographic and longitudinal interview study of college women and in-depth interviews with their parents, I argue that mid-tier flagship universities still push women toward gender complementarity—a gender-traditional model of economic security pairing a career oriented man with a financially dependent woman. Combining multilevel and intersectional theories, I show that the infrastructure and campus peer culture at Midwest University supports this gendered logic of class reproduction, which reflects an affluent, white, and heterosexual femininity. I argue that this logic (...) may only work for a minority of students, and plays a role in reinforcing class inequities among women. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE HISTORICAL CONDITIONING OF CHURCH DOCTRINE* JOHN R. T. LAMONT Winnipeg, Canada I WISH to set out and defend a certain conception of what is involved in accepting the teachings of the Catholic Church. This conception is at odds with some contemporary understandings of the way in which such teachings are historically conditioned. I will argue that these conceptions are mistaken, and state what I think to be the (...) correct understanding of the historical conditioning of dogma. I Possession of the Catholic faith is usually understood to involve belief in the doctrines infallibly taught by the Catholic Church, so that outward profession of, and inward assent to, those doctrines, whether explicit or implicit, is a necessary condition for being a Catholic. I do not intend to discuss which particular doctrines are infallibly taught, or how exactly one determines that a doctrine is infallibly taught. I will simply assume that there are such doctrines, and that it is possible to determine that they are infallibly taught, and go on to ask the question, What does acceptance of these doctrines consist in? (The simpler expression "teachings of the Church" will be used to mean "infallible teachings of the Church" in the rest of this paper.) I propose this answer: • This paper had its origin in the lectures prepared for the author's philosophy of religion course at Chishawasha Seminary, Harare. The author would like to thank Fr. Norman Tanner, S.J., Fr. J.M. R. Tillard, O.P., and his colleagues at the Seminary and the University of Manitoba, for their helpful comments and suggestions. 511 512 JOHN R. T. LAMONT F). To accept the teachings of the Church is to believe that the propositions expressed by the sentences taught by the Church are true. Some comment on F) is necessary in order to make its meaning clear. A) "Propositions" Propositions, according to philosophers and logicians,1 possess the following characteristics. They are i) the bearers of truth or falsity. Whatever can be described as true, or as false, is a proposition. ii) the meanings of meaningful sentences. Different sentences can mean the same thing; for instance, the English sentence "Snow is white" and the French sentence "La neige est blanche" mean the same thing. What these two sentences have in common-what they mean-is a proposition. iii) the objects of cognitive, or propositional, attitudes. Such attitudes include knowing, doubting, wishing, disbelieving, suspending judgment about, expecting. When you know something or disbelieve something, what you know or disbelieve is a proposition. When you hope for something or fear that something might happen, what you hope for or fear is that some proposition might be true. Since the teachings of the Church are things that can be believed or disbelieved, are held to be true (by Catholics) and false (by some non-Catholics), and are expressed by sentences,' it follows that they are propositions.3 B) "Propositions expressed by sentences" Humans communicate propositions to each other by means of sentences. A sentence is a physical object, or a physical happening; ' See, for example, the introduction to Propositions and Attitudes, edited by Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames (Oxford, 1988). I have tried to describe in a previous paper the sort of reasons that have led philosophers to maintain that propositions are the objects of cognitive attitudes such as knowing, believing, or hoping ("The Nature of Revelation," New Blackfriars [July-August 1991]: 335-45). 2 I do not mean to assert here that all the Church's teachings are expressed in sentences, only that the Church does at times express her teachings in sentences (which is undeniable). It is possible for the Church to teach through actions, such as liturgical actions, as well as through sentences. However, since what is taught in such actions will be something that can be known and believed, such teachings will be propositions. 3 The question whether the teachings of the Church are propositions is not the same as the question whether divine revelation is propositional-whether divine revelation consists wholly or partly of propositions communicated by God to humans. I have argued (in "The Nature of Revelation") that revelation is at least partly propositional. However, the THE CONDITIONING... (shrink)

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration's rationale for supporting the development and approval of BiDil for heart failure specifically in black patients was based on under-powered, post hoc subgroup analyses of two relatively old trials , which were further complicated by substantial covariate imbalances between racial groups. Indeed, the only statistically significant difference observed between black and white patients was found without any adjustment for potential confounders in samples that were unlikely to have been adequately randomized. Meanwhile, because the (...) accepted baseline therapy for heart failure has substantially improved since these trials took place, their results cannot be combined with data from the more recent trial amongst black patients alone. There is therefore little scientific evidence to support the approval of BiDil only for use in black patients, and the FDA's rationale fails to consider the ethical consequences of recognizing racial categories as valid markers of innate biological difference, and permitting the development of group-specific therapies that are subject to commercial incentives rather than scientific evidence or therapeutic imperatives. This paper reviews the limitations in the scientific evidence used to support the approval of BiDil only for use in black patients; calls for further analysis of the V-HeFT I and II data which might clarify whether responses to H-I vary by race; and evaluates the consequences of commercial incentives to develop racialized medicines. We recommend that the FDA revise the procedures they use to examine applications for race-based therapies to ensure that these are based on robust scientific claims and do not undermine the aims of the 1992 Revitalization Act. (shrink)

In the United States, low-income or minority populations tend toward earlier births than the more advantaged. In disadvantaged populations, one factor that may exert pressure toward early births is “weathering,” or pervasive health uncertainty. Are subjective perceptions of health related to fertility timing? Drawing on a small sample of intensive interviews with teenage mothers-to-be, I suggest that low-income African American teenagers may expect uncertain health and short lifespans. Where family economies and caretaking systems are based on kin networks, such perceptions (...) may influence the decision to become a young mother. Heuristic typologies of ways socially situated knowledge may contribute to the reproduction of fertility timing practices contrast the experiences of poor African American interviewees, working class white interviewees, and middle-class teens who typically postpone childbearing. (shrink)

African-American/Africana philosophy has made a name for itself as a critical perspective on the inadequacies of European philosophical thought. While this polemical mode has certainly contributed to the questioning of and debates over the universalism of white philosophy, it has nonetheless left Africana philosophy dependent on these criticisms to justify its existence as “philosophical.” This practice has the effect of not only distracting Black philosophers from understanding the thought of their ancestors, but formulates the practice of Africana philosophy as (...) “racial therapy” for whites. By making the goal of Africana philosophy the transformation of the white racist to the white non-racist, Africana philosophy takes up a decidedly political (integrationist) agenda. Making this agenda the guiding ethos of Africana philosophical praxis censors both the Africana thinkers available to study and the interpretation of the figures deemed “fit” for study. Thus I conclude a culturalogic approach is the best way to delineate between the political and methodological in Africana philosophy. (shrink)

Traditionally ‘imagination’ primarily denotes the faculty of mental imagery, other usages being derivative. However, contemporary philosophers commonly hold it to be a polysemous term, with several unrelated senses. This effectively eliminates this culturally important concept as an appropriate explanandum for science, and paves the way for a thoroughgoing eliminative materialism. White challenges both these views of imagination, arguing that ‘imagine’ never means ‘suppose,’ ‘believe,’ ‘pretend’ or ‘visualize,’ that imagery may occur without imagination, and that the true sense of ‘imagine’ (...) is (roughly) ‘think of as possibly being so.’ I defend a version of the traditional view. The disseverance of imagination from imagery is motivated by an implicit version of the theory of mental images as pictures. Other contemporary scientific theories of imagery do not entail it. I defend a view of imagery as arising from the interpretative aspect of perception (‘seeing-as’) and connect this, and our contemporary concept of imagination, to the root Aristotelian concept of φαντασία.This captures the association between imagination and creativity, and reveals the coherence of the concept, more plausibly than White’s theory. (shrink)

In this chapter I problematize Beauvoir's analogical analyses in The Second Sex, arguing that her utilization of the race/gender analogy omits the experiences and oppressions of Black women. Furthermore, taking into account select secondary literature that emphasizes these issues, I argue that several of Beauvoir's white feminist defenders and critics share in common their non‐engagement with Black feminist literature on Beauvoir. Put another way, Black feminists who explicitly take up Beauvoir in their writings have remained largely unacknowledged in the (...) secondary literature on Beauvoir by white feminists. As a corrective to this erasure, I highlight the scholarly contributions of Black feminists including Loraine Hansberry, Chikwenye Ogunyemi, Deborah King, Oyeronke Oyewumi, and bell hooks. (shrink)

The brain in its plasticity and inherent 'sociality' can be proclaimed and projected as a revolutionary organ. Far from the old reactions which opposed the authenticity of political theory and praxis to the dangerous naturalism of 'cognitive science' (with images of men in white coats, the RAND Corporation or military LSD experiments), recent decades have shown us some of the potentiality of the social brain (Vygotsky, and more recently Negri 1995 and Negri 2000, Virno 2001). Is the brain somehow (...) inherently a utopian topos? If in some earlier papers I sought to defend naturalism against these reactions, here I consider a new challenge: the recently emerged disciplines of neuronormativity, which seek in their own way to overcome the nature-normativity divide. This is the task of a materialist brain theory today. 1. The setup: horns of a dilemma There is a lingering zone of what one might think of as sore cognitive muscle tissue in the area of materialism. It is an area of both contested territory and in some cases, a kind of pathos of distance of the 'Ugh! Keep that thing away from me!' sort. I have in mind the combination of materialism as an emancipatory socio-political project (which need not be construed in strictly Marx-Engels terms, if we think of Lucretius et al.) and as a cold-hearted 'spontaneous philosophy of the men in white coats', e.g. nefarious neurophilosophers. Faced with this rather massive alternative, this choice between two projects, I have stubbornly been saying since some discussions with Negri in the late 90s. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:184 BOOK REVIEWS knower, one may avoid undercutting the position that the cognitive powers are passive, without failing to do justice to the fact that aware· ness and discrimination are activities of the knower {pp. 71-72; 148· 49, n. 6). Second, Kai holds that the individual human being cannot really he said to have intuitive mind in himself: "Man has mind; hut only to a certain degree and without (...) mind losing its independence from the human whole.... the divine mind is present in man without los· ing its character of divine mind " (p. 75). If only God has intuitive mind {pp. 155, n. 32; 156-57, n. 13), how can the individual human being really know, even in the sense of having discursive thought? Since knowledge depends on first principles, what does not possess the intuitive mind which knows the first principles would, it seems, not properly have knowledge. The only hope for a definitive interpretation of the disconcertingly brief De Anima, 3. 5, lies in the possibility that one can establish a definite connection between this chapter and other elements in the Aris· totelian corpus, a connection that would elucidate the otherwise in· scrutable teaching on active mind. It is the great merit of Kai to have made an excellent case for a connection between De Anima, 3. 5, and two other elements in the Aristotelian corpus: nous as it functions in the logic and epistemology, and the unmoved mover of Metaphysics, Lambda. Exploring this connection in a penetrating and thorough analysis of a great body of Aristotelian and secondary te~ts, Kai has not merely taken a position on a more than two-thousand-year-old con· troversy, hut also has decisively advanced our understanding of active mind. St. John's University Jamaica, New York JAMES T. H. MARTIN Anselm Studies: An Occasional Journal. Vol. 2. Edited by JosEPH ScHNAUBELT, OSA, et al., White Plains, New York: Kraus Inter· national Publications, 1988. Pp. 634. $55.00. This volume contains the proceedings of the Fifth International Saint Anselm Conference (Villanova University, September 16-21, 1985). Held in conjunction with the Tenth International Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference, the meeting occasioned papers concen· trating on areas of "influence and juncture" in the life and thought of St. Anselm and St. Augustine. Given the dependence of much of Anselm's work on the thought of St. Augustine, the Conference took as its particular objective the understanding of the relationship between BOOK REVIEWS 185 faith and reason. While the focus of the papers in this volume includes both saints, the principal emphasis falls on Anselm as inheritor and interpretor of the methods and ideas of his intellectual ancestor. A brief introduction provides cameo presentations of Anselm's character as abbot, monk, and archbishop, together with a conspectus on Anselm's position vis-a-vis the canonical and ecclesiological issues of his day. The papers are then divided into five chapters: "Anselm's Monasticism." "The Proslogion Argument," "Truth: Anselm and Augustine," "Theological Method," and "The Anselmian Worldview." While the papers are of use to scholarly readers desiring detailed treatment of central issues in Anselm's logic and epistemology, the un· doubted strength of the collection lies in its well-calculated effort to integrate an understanding of Anselm's intellectual and spiritual out· look with the theological, spiritual, and literacy currents of his time. Especially for the historian of intellect and society, the essays in this volume provide analysis that advances our understanding of the cultural context of the 11th and 12th centuries. The contribution to our understanding of Anselm's culture is par· ticularly clear in the first and fourth divisions of the volume, the sec· tions dealing with monasticism and Anselm's worldview. In the former division, Glenn Olsen's assessment of " Anselm and Homosexuality" neatly evaluates the evidence for Anselm's sexual orientation made controversial by John Boswell's Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality. In fact, the present article, together with its notes, provides a useful summary of the critical literature which has grown up of late around the Boswellian thesis as well as the study of literary expressions of affection in the 11th and 12th centuries. Olsen grasps the... (shrink)

I examine how white British members of a London-area environmental group conceptualize race in relation to ecological disasters. Based on a five-year (2018–2022) ethnographic study, members employed racialized narratives and symbolic boundaries to construct who was the cause of disasters, who had the moral responsibility or calling to remediate disasters, and who possessed the adequate resources and capacity to fix disasters. Together, these narratives formed a tripartite racial imaginary which functioned to demarcate the symbolic boundaries of an ideal, (...) class='Hi'>white racial identity that was intimately crocheted with notions of authentic guilt and remorse, responsibility and liability, work ethics, competent knowledge, resource mobilization, moral commitment, and racial paternalism and superiority. Through the pursuit of this White racial ideal, members frequently conceptualized ecological disasters throughout the non-white world as the fault of specific actions by non-White people, identified unique racialized actors as the proper responsible parties for working on the remediation of ecological disasters, and also assigned particular White people from Westernized, industrial, democratic states as the only people in possession of the appropriate knowledge, resources, and character to clean-up and manage a healthy environment. (shrink)

The unchanging realities of race relations in the United States, recently highlighted by the catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina, demonstrate that Black Americans are still not viewed, treated or protected as citizens in this country. The rates of poverty, disease and incarceration in Black communities have been recognized by some Critical Race Theorists as genocidal acts. Despite the appeal to the international community’s interpretation of human rights, Blacks are still the most impoverished and lethally targeted group in America. Given the “ (...) class='Hi'>white racial framing” that stems from “white habitus,” and enforced systemically, the situation of Black Americans is best described through a racial realist perspective, in which racial equality is merely an illusion. Under such dire colonial circumstances, I argue that there should be a renewed discussion on the role that violence and decolonization can play in the American context. (shrink)

The unchanging realities of race relations in the United States, recently highlighted by the catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina, demonstrate that Black Americans are still not viewed, treated or protected as citizens in this country. The rates of poverty, disease and incarceration in Black communities have been recognized by some Critical Race Theorists as genocidal acts. Despite the appeal to the international community’s interpretation of human rights, Blacks are still the most impoverished and lethally targeted group in America. Given the “ (...) class='Hi'>white racial framing” that stems from “white habitus,” and enforced systemically, the situation of Black Americans is best described through a racial realist perspective, in which racial equality is merely an illusion. Under such dire colonial circumstances, I argue that there should be a renewed discussion on the role that violence and decolonization can play in the American context. (shrink)

Frank Wilderson: I introduce a semiotic configuration. The point is, at important levels of abstraction, people who are positioned as Black—which is very different from saying people who think of themselves as Black. One of the basic premises of Afropessimism, which makes it resonate with psychoanalysis or Marxism, is that where one is positioned in a paradigm might not be where one thinks one is or where one desires to be. When I teach undergraduates, I say: “Look, I used to (...) study neorealism. In these neorealist films, we have these people who are bona fide fascists, and then you have those people in the Communist Party, so they could not agree on much. They don’t see themselves as having much of a connection. But in a Gramscian sense, they are both positioned as the host of capitalist parasites. Both groups rely on the wage. So, they are both workers.” One of the big points with respect to the narratological question is that I, as a Black person, trained at Columbia University in creative writing, trained at UC Berkeley in critical theory, love narrative, but narrative does not love me. In other words, it is impossible for me to be “emplotted” as a speaking subject. I can only be “emplotted” as an object of narrative. But I am always struggling to attain that love of humanity; and if I were to attain it, the Human would not have a foil against which to know itself. So, what I am saying is that in a book like Red, White & Black, I am just being very categorically clear about the divisions. In Afropessimism, I am actually talking about the desire of a sentient being who cannot be allowed into an arena where people are recognized and incorporated, in Lacanian terms, as “contemporaries” of human beings. So, there is all this back and forth. I don’t think this speaking subject in Afropessimism ever achieves anything in particular. It is always struggling toward being a subject that can actually travel on a narrative arc and yet ultimately is an object that can never travel from dispossession to redemptive recovery. (shrink)

History has demonstrated the necessity of protecting research participants. Research ethics are based on a concept of asymmetry of power, viewing the researcher as powerful and potentially dangerous and establishing ethics committees as external agencies in the field of research. We argue in favour of expanding this perspective on relationships of power to encompass the ethics committees as one among several actors that exert power and that act in a relational interplay with researchers and participants. We employ Michel Foucault’s ideas (...) of power as an omnipresent force which is dynamic and unstable, as well as the notion that knowledge and power are inextricably intertwined. The article discusses how research ethics committees may affect academic freedom. In addition it is pointed out that research participants could be harmed — not only by unfortunate research practices, but also by being subjected to the protective efforts of ethics monitoring bodies. (shrink)

Актуальність теми дослідження в тому, що представлено напрями підвищення промислового менеджменту в сучасних умовах. Від того, яким чином буде здійснюватися управління виробничим процесом підприємства, залежить його ефективність, прибутковість та конкурентоспроможність в умовах ринкової економіки. Постановка завдання – аналіз різноманітних напрямів підвищення ефективності промислового менеджменту з використанням інформаційних ресурсів; оцінка ролі і значення виробничого потенціалу підприємства в суспільному виробництві. Аналіз останніх досліджень і публікацій - в статті представлено аналіз основних положень теоретичного обґрунтування напрямів підвищення ефективності промислового менеджменту, які знайшли своє відображення (...) у роботах вітчизняних науковців Г.Осовської, В.Воронкової, Р.Фатхутдинова, Н.Подольчак, А.Шегди. Методологічним фундаментом здійснення дослідження обраної тематики стали праці провідних вчених, фахівців, науковців, зокрема дослідженням показниківпідвищення ефективності роботи підприємства займалися І Бойчик, О.Гетьман, І.Ковальчук, С.Покропивний, Ю.Пономарьова, В.Сідун, В.Шаповал та інші. Виділення недосліджених частин загальної проблеми – проведено на основі непередбачуваності сучасних економічних умов діяльності підприємств, що потребує подальшого дослідження і визначення реальних шляхів стабілізації та можливого підвищення ефективності роботи підприємств. Методологія – системного, структурного, структурно-функціонального аналізу, що дозволили проаналізувати проблеми напрямів підвищення ефективності промислового менеджменту з використанням інформаційних ресурсів. Виклад основного матеріалу. В статті проаналізовано виробничий потенціал підприємства. Розглянуто питання вимірювання величини і рівня ефективності використання виробничого потенціалу за допомогою використання сучасних методик на основі дослідження провідних методологій. Доведено, що уявлення про величину виробничого потенціалу підприємства і окремих його елементів дозволяє до певної міри управляти характеристиками потенціалу, внаслідок чого виникає можливість цілеспрямованої дії на віддачу виробничих ресурсів. Висновки - Провівши дослідження доведено, що під резервами підвищення економічної ефективності виробництва розуміють невикористані можливості збільшення випуску продукції в розрахунку на одиницю сукупних витрат завдяки більш раціональному використанню усіх видів ресурсів підприємства. (shrink)

The antithesis of nature and freedom is the central idea of Kant's philosophy. It is the direct expression of its postulated division of all existing things into the world of phenomena, which in their sum-total constitute nature, and its original foundation—the world of things in themselves, which lie beyond the categorial determinations of nature. Necessity and causal relations, like space and time, apply only to the world of phenomena; the world of things in themselves is free of these determinations and, (...) therefore, constitutes the realm of freedom—freedom from the intractable laws of nature. Thus, Kant, on the one hand, proves the unconditional subsumption of phenomena under the laws of nature, under the strictest determinism, and, on the other, insists just as decisively that freedom is the first, pretemporal link in the cause-and-effect chain of events. True, the existence of this original freedom is unprovable; it is unknowable, supersensible, and transcendent. But if we agree that there are not only phenomena but also things in themselves, then the conclusion about freedom is fully justified. If, on the other hand, we reject the existence of things in themselves, then we deny at the same time any possibility of freedom, for there are no exceptions in natural determinism. (shrink)